Birth can be a harm

It is often claimed that birth cannot be a harm to the person born because there was no one to be harmed; that judging birth and the ensuing life as a harm requires that there be a previous state to which to compare the new state. Allegedly, such a comparison of existence to nonexistence is nonsensical.

In response to this, I have two (unoriginal) thought experiments.

  • Imagine you were given the choice to either die painlessly right now, or be tortured to death as slowly and painfully as possible. In effect, you get to choose either nonexistence or a horrible existence. Does comparing existence and nonexistence still make no sense? Would you argue that there is no reason to consider one option over the other?
  • Imagine a man and a woman, both carriers of Tay-Sachs disease, who want to have a child together. The disease makes it likely[1] that a child created by them will suffer increasingly horribly and finally die at the age of four. Would it be better if their hypothetical child never existed, or does comparing existence and nonexistence still not make any sense (i.e., would it be perfectly fine if these people had such a child)?

Clearly, I see no reason why comparing existence to nonexistence is nonsensical.

Birth can be a harm because the person born is around after the fact. What matters is that the “victim” will experience the consequences (in this case until their death).

Consequently, I do not think death is necessarily a harm to the person dying; there is no one to experience the consequences after the fact. What harms is the anticipation and the suffering leading up to death.

As The Plague Doctor notes in the comments: this is why omnicide is justified, as long as it’s (1) simultaneous (2) instantaneous and (3) without prior warning.

[1] A probability of 0.25, according to Wikipedia, but the number does not really matter.

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7 Responses to “Birth can be a harm”

  1. jim Says:

    My thoughts exactly, Tim. Examples such as yours are so commonsensical that it baffles me when people keep arguing the identity issue.

  2. Tim Cooijmans Says:

    Well, as far as I know, I stole the first example from you, and the second example from Chip. In this post and the previous post, I’m trying to make a couple of very basic and obviously true (as true as true can be) arguments. In a way this and the previous post have been a condensation of things we already knew (and kept repeating in different ways).

    That said, I do think the ideas expressed in the last two paragraphs are new. This post sat in my drafts for weeks with just those two paragraphs; they are the reason why I wrote this.

  3. The Plague Doctor Says:

    Consequently, I do not think death is necessarily a harm to the person dying; there is no one to experience the consequences after the fact. What harms is the anticipation and the suffering leading up to death.

    This is why omnicide is justified, as long as it’s (1) simultaneous (2) instantaneous and (3) without prior warning.

    • Tim Cooijmans Says:

      I don’t usually reply to comments unless I have something to add or defend, but I thought this was an important addition to the main post so I included it there. Thanks, PD.

      • The Plague Doctor Says:

        It is also the reason why I am not opposed to slaughtering animals humanely (under anaesthesia). Very social animals (such as elephants), who grieve for their relatives, might form an exception.

      • The Plague Doctor Says:

        On second thought, the simultaneity requirement would imply a prohibition on assisted suicide, as that death would then be a harm to the surviving friends and family; so I need to think this trough some more.

      • Tim Cooijmans Says:

        While the non-simultaneity weighs against assisted suicide, it does not prohibit it. It is obviously a trade-off between the suicide’s well-being and their friends’ well-being. The former is probably more important; suicide is not chosen lightly (at least not in most cultures).

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