This is a response to this comment, which was too long to post there. The context is a thought experiment involving two buttons; a “fast” button that makes all sentient life to die immediately and painlessly, and a “slow” button that sterilizes all sentient life.
I agree that antinatalism shouldn’t be the term for the idea that sentience sucks and should be done away with, but I think antinatalism isn’t the optimal solution anyway (wrt consequences). (I don’t expect this to be controversial; if all sentient life on this planet were to go extinct through a lack of procreation, there would be a not insignificant probability of it existing after we are gone (through evolution of non-sentient life here into sentient life, or through sentient life already existing elsewhere).)
But what is this right to live and die that you speak of? Is it similar to the right to have kids?
Obviously, I know what you mean by it, but it isn’t that clear-cut. The right to have kids conflicts with the right to live and die as you choose, and the right to live and die as you choose conflicts with other people’s rights to the money that you owe them, et cetera. You can encode morality in terms of a bunch of rights and duties, but then you have to decide which rules to break and which to follow.
You can do this by favoring the “more important” rules over the “less important” rules, but how do you decide which is more “important”?
I cannot see any other useful way of measuring the importance of a rule (in the context of a certain decision) than by the consequences that breaking it would have. In sloppy words, you can justify killing a serial killer because all else being equal there would be fewer kills in total. (Note that the justification is NOT that the serial killer has “given up his rights” because he broke a rule or something like that, because it is impossible to live without breaking any of the rules that people usually agree on.)
Furthermore, I cannot see any other useful way of measuring the magnitude of the consequences than in terms of suffering and/or pleasure experienced. Note that in these discussions, “suffering” usually means “experiences which the experiencer considers undesirable”, and similarly for “happiness”. So there is no inherent vagueness or irreconcilable subjectivity there.
Well, that is one way in which the consent/rights/deontologist view is problematic. Another is that it is based on the notion of a self. Yet another is that it has nothing to say on the atrocities that nature commits: we can’t live and die as we choose because nature might build a couple of healthy, natural tumors in your body and since nature is not a “morally culpable” entity, there is no way to condemn this in such a moral framework. At best you could go look for someone to sue for negligence.
(In the context of the thought experiment, the second button would leave people alive and vulnerable to reality, which in all likelihood would get worse as most of them died and society would no longer be able to provide for them. The consequences would be disastrous, but your moral framework has no way to recognize and take into account this harm, as none of its rules would be broken (except the “minor offense” of pushing the button).)
What is “right” and “wrong” as determined by this intricate web of self/intent/consent/right/culpability/fairness/intuition/respect/privacy is a gray area. That I agree with. However, what is “good” and “bad” in terms of consequences is perfectly black and white, at least in a metaphorical sense. The goodness of an action is an objective property of that action: it is the goodness of reality after that action. We may not always be able to measure/predict this goodness perfectly accurately, but that does not make it any less objective (by which I mean independent of what we think).
What is this “goodness”? This is the only morally loaded question we’re left with. That’s a huge cleanup when compared to the rule-based mess where every rule was potentially controversial. Once we settle this, it’s all clear-cut from there. If you decide that paperclips are good, then it follows that you should always act in such a way as to maximize the number of paperclips in the universe. At any one moment in time, which of the possible actions available to you would maximize this is an indisputable fact of reality.
If we could get people to give up their irrational beliefs (god, natural rights, karma, gaia, et cetera), I am pretty damn sure we could finally agree that it is only suffering and pleasure that matter. We would be united under the common goal of maximizing some combination of those two. In this light, pushing the first button is far superior to pushing the second button. Note that while the antinatalist asymmetry heavily involves the concept of self, it is true on a lower level as well: causing a brain to be created causes more suffering than pleasure because the desire for pleasure and the frustration of said desire manifests as suffering.